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In the 2004 Report, A More Secure World, the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges 
and Change (HLP) championed ‘a collective international responsibility to protect’ as 
a key component of its vision for the United Nations (UN) collective security system.1  
In doing so the HLP revived the responsibility to protect which had languished on the 
international stage, a casualty of the ‘war on terror’, since its inception in 2001 by the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS).  Indeed A 
More Secure World provided the platform for the endorsement of the responsibility to 
protect ‘populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity’ by the UN General Assembly (GA) at the 2005 World Summit which was 
subsequently endorsed by the UN Security Council (SC).2  However the guidelines for 
military intervention for human protection purposes, a central facet of the responsibility 
to protect, are conspicuously absent from these endorsements.   
 
This article charts the articulation of the responsibility to protect at the UN and 
examines the guidelines for military intervention for human protection purposes 
proposed by the ICISS and HLP within the framework of the just war tradition.  It is 
argued that the disappearance of the guidelines from the responsibility to protect 
framework adopted by the UN undermines the capacity of the UN to effectively respond 
to genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.  Moreover, the 
just war tradition offers a fruitful frame of analysis that addresses the arguments that 
prompted the removal of the guidelines for military intervention from the responsibility 
to protect framework.  It also reveals the potentially central role for international law in 
the authorisation and regulation of military force for human protection purposes.  As 
such, the article proceeds in three parts the first of which charts the translation of the 
                                                 
1 HLP, A More Secure World: Our shared responsibility (UN 2004) para. 203. 
2 GA Res  60/1, ‘Outcome Document’ (2005), paras. 138 and 139; SC Res 1674 (2006) para. 4.  
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responsibility ‘from document to doctrine’3 at the UN with specific reference to the 
guidelines for military intervention for human protection purposes before moving to 
explore the roles for the SC and UN peace operations envisioned under the guidelines 
in Parts II and III respectively, with the crisis in Darfur serving as a reference point.   
I. LOST IN TRANSLATION: THE GUIDELINES FOR MILITARY 
INTERVENTION 
The responsibility to protect is the progeny of ICISS and in essence means: 
sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their own citizens from 
avoidable catastrophe . . . but that when they are unwilling or unable to do so, 
that responsibility must be borne by the broader community of states4 
 
Thus the responsibility to protect lies first and foremost with the state and a secondary 
responsibility to protect falls to the ‘broader community of states’ when the state is 
unwilling or unable to halt or avert serious harm befalling a population.  A fundamental 
facet of the responsibility to protect, as articulated by the ICISS, is the idea of a 
‘continuum of obligations’5, that is the idea that the responsibility to protect consists of 
three dimensions – the responsibility to prevent, the responsibility to react and the 
responsibility to rebuild.  Nonetheless the responsibility to react has been the focus of 
academic commentary, in particular the guidelines for military intervention for human 
protection purposes.  These guidelines – right intention, right authority, just cause, last 
resort, proportional means and reasonable prospects – determine when, how and by 
whom the responsibility to react is be exercised and garnered plaudits such as ‘the most 
sophisticated attempt at establishing a moral guideline for international action in the 
face of humanitarian emergency’.6   
 
Indeed the HLP, which firmly placed the responsibility to protect on the international 
agenda by championing it as pivotal pillar in its vision of comprehensive collective 
security, while acknowledging that the responsibility to protect spans a ‘continuum 
involving prevention, response to violence, if necessary, and rebuilding shattered 
                                                 
3 Rebecca Hamilton. ‘The Responsibility to Protect: From document to doctrine – but what of 
implementation?’ (2006) 19 Harvard Human Rights Journal 289. 
4 ICISS, The Responsibility to Protect (International Development Research Centre 2001) viii. 
5 Gareth Evans, ‘From Humanitarian Intervention to the Responsibility to Protect’, (2006) 24 
Wisconsin International Law Journal 703, 709. 
6 Graham Day and Christopher Freeman, ‘Operationalising the Responsibility to Protect – the 
Policekeeping Approach’ (2005) 11 Global Governance 139, 139 
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societies’7 focused on the responsibility to react.  The HLP set out guidelines for 
military intervention for human protection purposes akin to the ICISS – seriousness of 
threat, proper purpose, last resort, proportional means and balance of consequences.  
For instance for the ICISS just cause includes ‘large-scale loss of life’ and ‘large-scale 
ethnic cleansing’ while the HLP included ‘genocide and other large scale killing’ under 
‘seriousness of threat’.8  Further both saw the use of military force as a last resort which 
must have a ‘reasonable chance’ of success and be proportionate to the humanitarian 
objective to be achieved, that is the ‘proper purpose’ or ‘right intention’.  Moreover, 
the ICISS etched out a role for the SC in exercising the responsibility to react under the 
criterion of ‘right authority’ while the HLP similarly envisioned the SC as exercising 
the responsibility to react.  In doing so, the ICISS and the HLP acknowledged the 
institutional obstacles, such as the privileged position of the P-5, including the veto, 
along with galvanising the necessary political will, facing the SC in the exercise of the 
responsibility to react.  However it was the HLP that addressed these obstacles facing 
the SC by putting forward proposals for the reform of the SC.  The HLP also discussed 
the role of UN peace operations recognising, as did the ICISS, that a ‘clear and 
unambiguous mandate is one of the first and most important requirements of an 
operation to protect’9 along with stressing the importance of securing ‘the necessary 
resources to implement that mandate fully’.10  
 
The then SG, Kofi Annan, endorsed the ‘more comprehensive concept of collective 
security’ envisioned by the HLP in his 2005 Report, In Larger Freedom, including the 
responsibility to protect and the proposals for SC reform.  However, as Alex J. Bellamy 
observes, the responsibility to protect was diluted in the transition from A More Secure 
World to In Larger Freedom.  Of particular note was the separation of the guidelines 
for military intervention from the endorsement of the responsibility to protect – a 
divorce that seemingly facilitated the endorsement of the responsibility to protect in 
principle by UN member states at the 2005 World Summit.11  Here world leaders 
declared themselves prepared: 
                                                 
7 HLP (n 1) para. 201 
8 ICISS (n 4) para. 32-34; HLP (n 1) para 207 (a). 
9 ICISS (n 4) para. 60; HLP(n 1) para 214. 
10 ICISS (n 4) para 60; HLP (n 1) para 214. 
11 See Alex J. Bellamy, ‘Whither the Responsibility to Protect? Humanitarian Intervention and the 2005 
World Summit’ (2006) Ethics and International Affairs 143, 166. 
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[t]o take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security 
Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-
case basis . . . should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are 
manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity12 
 
The ‘case-by-case basis’ by which this responsibility to react is to be exercised by the 
SC is underscored by the absence of guidelines for military intervention in the Outcome 
Document and exacerbated by the commitment to merely continue to discuss SC 
reform.13  Indeed the US specifically referred to the preservation of SC discretion when 
opposing the inclusion of the guidelines while Russia and China, along with some 
developing countries, rejected the guidelines for military intervention for human 
protection purposes, albeit on non-interventionist grounds.  For instance, developing 
countries saw the guidelines as a ‘Trojan-horse’, arguing that the possibility of abuse 
that permeates such guidelines precludes their adoption.  Moreover, while France and 
the UK were receptive to the guidelines for military intervention for human protection 
purposes, they voiced concerns as to the capacity of guidelines to galvanise the SC to 
act.14   
 
These shortcomings are assimilated and consolidated in the recent Report by the SG, 
Ban Ki Moon, ‘Implementing the Responsibility to Protect’.15  This is unsurprising as 
the Report is based on the ‘authoritative framework’ of the Outcome Document.16  Thus 
while the Report acknowledges the ‘hard truth that no strategy for fulfilling the 
responsibility to protect would be complete without the possibility of enforcement 
measures, including through sanctions or coercive military action in extreme cases’, it 
merely suggests that the SC or the GA could authorise such collective measures.17  This 
acknowledgement does little to temper Bellamy’s indictment that the responsibility to 
protect, as found in the Outcome Document and thus in the SG’s report, ‘does little to 
prevent future Rwandas and Kosovos’,18 which to too readily evident in the ‘glacial 
speed’19 at which the UN has responded to the crisis in Darfur.  Indeed the response to 
                                                 
12 Outcome Document (n 2) para. 139 (emphasis added) 
13 Ibid para 153. 
14 Bellamy, ‘Whither’ (n 11) 167. 
15 SG, ‘Implementing the Responsibility to Protect’ (12 January 2009). 
16 Ibid para 2. 
17 Ibid para 56. 
18 Bellamy, ‘Whither’ (n 11), 146. 
19 HLP (n 1) para 42. 
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the crisis in Darfur not only underscores the practical imperative for guidelines for 
military intervention for human protection purposes but also demands an assessment of 
the veracity of the arguments that ensured their removal from the responsibility to 
protect framework, particularly as the UN, including the SC, has accepted the 
responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity.  Indeed the arguments of SC discretion, and the possibility of 
abuse and securing the necessary political will and consensus to act imbued the debate 
on the responsibility to protect at the 2005 World Summit.  These arguments, together 
with the unsettled legal status of this principle,, have mired this ‘inconclusive debate’ 
on humanitarian intervention.20  The responsibility to react, including guidelines for 
military intervention, is not yet an established legal norm.  Moreover, these proposed 
guidelines do not yet provide a justificatory and enabling framework determining when, 
how and by whom the responsibility to react is exercised.  As such, it is proposed to 
draw upon the just war tradition which, as a ‘two-thousand year old conversation about 
the legitimacy of war’21, ‘encompasses many of the arguments’22 that revolve around 
the guidelines for military intervention for human protection purposes in order to 
identify and develop the legal and normative framework for the roles for the SC and 
UN peace operations under the responsibility to react.  
II. GALVANISING THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL 
The guidelines for military intervention for human protection purposes espoused by the 
ICISS and the HLP invoke the just war tradition, particularly the criteria governing the 
resort to war.23  Indeed there are important points of correlation between the guidelines 
and these just war norms, not in the least that both purport to govern the resort to 
military force.  Furthermore, while disagreement abounds as the ‘interpretation . . . and 
relative weight’24 to be accorded to the jus ad bellum criteria and thus ‘not all 
contemporary just war theorists offer the same list’25, there is a broad consensus within 
the just war tradition as to the ‘common set of rules governing the decision to wage 
                                                 
20 Louise Arbour, ‘The Responsibility to Protect as a Duty of Care in International Law and Practice’ 
(2008) 34 Review of International Studies 445, 447. 
21 Bellamy, Just Wars: From Cicero to Iraq (Polity 2006) 4. 
22 Mona Fixdal and Dan Smith, ‘Humanitarian Intervention and Just War’ (1993) 42 Mershon 
International Studies Review 283. 
23 Thomas G. Weiss remarks that the ICISS proposed ‘a modified just war doctrine for future 
interventions’.  Thomas G. Weiss, Humanitarian Intervention: Ideas in Action (Polity 2007) 111. 
24 Bellamy, Just War (n 21) 4.  
25 Michael Bough et al, Rethinking the Just War Tradition (SNUY Press 2007) 244. 
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war’26, namely right authority, just cause, right intention, last resort, proportional 
means, and reasonable prospects of success. As such, for the present purpose of 
assessing the guidelines for military intervention for human protection purposes within 
a just war framework, little significance is attached to the slightly different taxonomies 
offered by the ICISS and the HLP.  
 
This Part draws on the just war tradition to explore the role for the SC in exercising the 
responsibility to react envisioned by the ICISS and the HLP by way of reference to the 
criteria of right authority, just cause and right intention, and places these criteria within 
the legal landscape of the international legal regulation of the use of force, the jus ad 
bellum. 
A. Right Authority 
There are two exceptions to the prohibition on the use of force found in Article 2 (4) of 
the UN Charter, namely the use of force in self-defence and the use of force pursuant 
to SC authorisation, upon an Article 39 determination that a ‘threat to the peace, breach 
of the peace, or act of aggression has occurred’.  Seen in this light the role accorded to 
the SC in exercising the responsibility to react by the ICISS and the HLP appears to 
satisfy the requirement of right authority with relative ease.  Indeed the ICISS noted 
that the SC is the most ‘appropriate body . . . to deal with military intervention issues 
for human protection purposes’ precisely because it has the legal capacity.27  
Nonetheless the criterion of right authority, as understood in the just war tradition, also 
entails consideration of the more nebulous issue of legitimacy which involves an 
inquiry ‘as to the breadth and depth of popular support this authority possesses’.28  The 
SC suffers from a well-documented legitimacy deficit29 particularly in relation to 
responding to genocide and ethnic cleansing which prompted the HLP to observe 
scathingly that‘[t]he Security Council so far has been neither very consistent nor very 
effective in dealing with cases, very often acting too late, too hesitantly, or not all’.30  
Indeed, as noted above, it was the HLP that attempted to address the legitimacy deficit 
by setting forth proposals for the reform of the SC. 
                                                 
26 Bellamy, Just War (n 21) 4.  
27 ICISS (n 4) 49. 
28 James Turner Johnson, Can Modern War be Just? (Yale University Press 1984) 24. 
29 HLP (n 1) 246-247.  
30 HLP (n 1) para. 202.  
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In brief, the HLP recommended that SC reform should take the form of enlargement 
and proposed two Models for expansion.  Under both models membership of the SC 
would increase from 15 to 24 states.31  While the focus of the HLP on enlargement is 
unsurprising when placed in historical context,32 the prognosis for such proposals 
remains unaltered namely that the UN ‘has its problems, but a bigger Security Council, 
far from solving them, will only reduce the Council’s effectiveness’.33  Indeed the 
HLP’s emphasis on ‘legitimacy in terms of the representativity of the Council’s 
composition’ rather than the ‘performance legitimacy’ of the SC,34 is all too readily 
illustrated by the retention of the veto powers of the P-5 under the proposed models.  
While the HLP explained this in terms of ‘[w]e see no practical way of changing the 
existing members’ veto powers’35 it was the threat of the veto, primarily by Russia and 
China, that stymied the initial response of the SC to the crisis in Darfur.  In this respect 
the proposal by the HLP that the P-5 ‘pledge themselves to refrain from the use of the 
veto in cases of genocide and large-scale human rights abuses’ is welcome.36  In 
particular the proposal intimates a connection between right authority and just cause 
thereby suggesting a potential way forward by which to alleviate the legitimacy deficit.  
B. Just Cause 
As violence erupted in Darfur in February 2003, the SC responded with ‘glacial 
speed’37 only determining in July 2004 the existence of a threat to the peace under 
Article 39, triggering Chapter VII enforcement measures in the form of sanctions.38  In 
the interim thousands of people had been killed in aerial and ground attacks39 with an 
estimated 200,000 people seeking refuge in neighbouring Chad.40  This is unsurprising 
for, as noted above, SC practice in respect of humanitarian crises such as genocide, 
ethnic cleansing and other incidents of mass human rights violations has been 
                                                 
31 HLP (n 1) paras 252 – 253. 
32 Yehuda Z. Blum, ‘Proposals for UN Security Council Reform’ (2005) 99 AJIL 632. 
33 W. Michael Reisman, ‘Expanding the Security Council: Much Ado’ (2005) 36 Security Dialogue 
373, 374. 
34 David M. Malone, ‘The High-Level Panel and the Security Council’ (2005) 36 Security Dialogue  
370, 371.  David M. Malone borrows the term ‘performance legitimacy’ from Ramesh Thakur.  
35 HLP (n 1) para 256. 
36 Ibid.   
37 Ibid para. 42. 
38 SC Res 1556 (2004), preamublar para. 21 
39 Human Rights Watch, Sudan: New Darfur Documents, 19 July 2004 available at 
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2004/07/19/sudan-new-darfur-documents accessed 4 March 2009. 
40 SC Res 1556 (2004) preamublar para. 20  
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inconsistent.  A survey of relevant SC practice revealed that humanitarian crises are not 
‘an autonomous issue’41 for the purposes of making an Article 39 determination 
prompting SC enforcement action.42  Indeed what little consistency is discernible in 
relevant SC practice is an insistence on an international dimension to the humanitarian 
crisis, such as refugee flows43 and an emphasis on the ‘unique character’ of the crisis.44  
Although this exercise of discretion is consistent with the Charter mandate of the SC 
‘to ensure prompt and effective action’,45 the initial response of the SC to the crisis in 
Darfur highlights the arguments advanced by the US at the 2005 World Summit in 
respect of SC discretion. 
 
It was against this backdrop of SC practice that the ICISS and the HLP promulgated 
‘just cause’ and ‘seriousness of threat’ which trigger the responsibility to react.  While, 
as noted above the ICISS and the HLP propose comparable thresholds, namely large 
scale loss of life, such as genocide and large scale ethnic cleansing, both succumb to a 
charge of indeterminacy46 which is not alleviated by the ‘narrow but deep’47 
understanding evident in the Outcome Document, that of ‘genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity’.  Nonetheless, such formulations are 
compatible with SC practice and is consistent with the just war tradition.  The emphasis 
in the just war tradition, particularly since the UN Charter, has been on self-defence as 
a just cause.  Nonetheless ‘the just war tradition contains a much richer vein of just 
cause’, including for humanitarian purposes.48  For instance, Walzer emphatically 
states:  
Against the enslavement or massacre of political opponents, national minorities 
and religious sects, there may well be no help unless help comes from outside.49 
 
                                                 
41 Christian Tomuschat, Human Rights: Between Idealism and Realism (OUP Oxford 2003) 129. 
42 Karel Wellens, ‘The UN Security Council and New Threats to the Peace: Back to the Future’ (2003) 
8 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 15 
43 For example, SC Resolution 841 spoke of the ‘negative repercussions’ of the refugee flows from 
Haiti on the region.  SC Res 841 (1993) preamublar para. 9.  In respect of Darfur see SC Res 1556 
(2004) preamublar para. 20.  
44 For instance, the SC explicitly emphasised the ‘unique character’ of the situation in Somalia.  SC Res 
794 (1992) preamublar para. 2. 
45 Article 24, UN Charter.  
46 Bellamy, ‘Whither’ (n 14) 148 – 151. 
47 SG, ‘Implementing’ (n 15) para. 10. 
48 Brough et al (n 25) 233.  
49 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A moral argument with historical illustrations (4th ed Basic 
Books 2006) 101.  
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Genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity are all defined by 
international law in treaties such as the Genocide Convention 1948 and the Rome 
Statute 1998, along with customary international law.  International law thus provides 
a crucial ground to draw from in order to lend greater determinacy to the just cause 
criterion of the responsibility to react whether understood as large-scale killing and 
large-scale ethnic cleansing or as the tetralogy of ‘genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity’.  For example, crimes against humanity are 
defined in the Rome Statute as certain actions ‘committed as part of a widespread or 
systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the 
attack’50 which includes large-scale killing without genocidal intent and ethnic 
cleansing and is ‘to a great extent predicated upon international human rights law’.51  
In a similar way, war crimes are defined as serious violations of international 
humanitarian law as found in customary and treaty law.52   
 
The prohibition on genocide is widely regarded as a norm of jus cogens and genocide 
is defined in the Genocide Convention as the intentional destruction ‘in whole or in 
part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group’ by killing members of the group, 
causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group, ‘deliberately inflicting 
on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in 
whole or in part’ and forcibly transferring children of one group to another group.53  In 
a recent decision the International Court of Justice (ICJ) found that Serbia had violated 
its obligations to prevent the genocide at Srebrenica in 1995.  In order to so the ICJ 
construed the obligation in Article I on states to prevent and punish genocide as 
entailing an obligation on states to refrain from engaging in genocide before holding 
that a failure to prevent genocide would engender state responsibility in addition to 
individual responsibility under the Convention.54   
 
                                                 
50 Article 7, Rome Statute 1998. 
51 Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law (2nd ed OUP 2008) 99. 
52 For example, Article 8 of the Rome Statute.  
53 Article II, Genocide Convention 1948; Article 6 of the Rome Statute.  
54 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia 
and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro [2007] ICJ Reports paras. 163 and 173. 
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The reluctance of the SC to accord the crisis in Darfur the status of genocide,55 
demonstrates the difficulty in satisfying the just cause criterion, even in the presence of 
a clear and well-established legal definition.  Bellamy offers an avenue to circumvent 
these threshold issues grounded in a relationship between right authority and just cause.  
In essence, the SC as the ‘most appropriate body’56 to exercise the responsibility to 
react, does so under the rubric of threat to the peace ‘presumably because common 
values have been violated’.57  As such the just cause criterion may comprise of ‘many 
injustices below the threshold of mass killing and ethnic cleansing’58 which were 
stipulated by the ICISS, the HLP and reflected in the Outcome Document.  In addition 
to circumventing the difficulties seen in respect of Darfur, this approach is also 
consistent with SC discretion in making Article 39 determinations.  Moreover, this 
approach maintains a role for international law in lending a greater degree of 
determinacy to the just cause criterion, particularly the elements of crimes against 
humanity and war crimes that are predicated upon international human rights law and 
international humanitarian law respectively.   
 
Furthermore, it is possible to view this ‘profound connection between right authority 
and the just cause threshold’59 from the perspective of the rule of law and more 
specifically, the legal constraints on SC decision-making.  In recent times, the question 
of legal constraints on SC decision-making has been brought into sharp relief as the 
type of activities, such as the issue of ‘quasi-legislative resolutions’, undertaken by the 
SC has burgeoned.60  However, as Simon Chesterman observes, ‘whether the rule of 
law applies to the UN remains unclear’.61  The argument presented here is that as the 
SC derives its discretion to exercise enforcement measures from the Charter, the 
                                                 
55 A Commission of Inquiry was established in 2004 which concluded that, although violations of 
international humanitarian law and international human rights law had occurred, Sudan had not 
pursued a genocidal policy in respect of Darfur.  Independent Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, 
‘Report of the Independent Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General’, 
available at http://www.un.org/News/dh/sudan/com_inq_darfur.pdf accessed 4 March 2009.  
56 HLP (n 1) para. 202; ICISS (n 4) 47. 
57 Bellamy, Just Wars (n 21) 209 (italics in original). 
58 Ibid 211. 
59 Ibid 208. 
60 See Simon Chesterman, ‘UNaccountable? The United Nations, Emergency Powers, and the Rule of 
Law in Asia’, New York University Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers, available at 
http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1095&context=nyu/plltwp accessed 4 February 2009 
2. 
61 Ibid 2. 
 11 
decision whether to do so or not is subjected to legal constraints.62  The ICJ was clear 
in the Admissions Case that political organs, such as the SC, operate within legal 
parameters that act as limitations on and criteria for decision-making.63  Thus the 
decision whether the just cause criterion has been satisfied for the purposes of military 
intervention for human protection purposes is informed by international law.  The task 
at hand, therefore, is to identify the relevant international law.  In this respect, it is 
widely accepted that the SC is constrained by jus cogens norms such as the prohibition 
on genocide.64  Alexander Orakhelashvili also counts international humanitarian law as 
jus cogens, along with international human rights law asserting in the latter respect that 
the SC ‘can never be entitled to infringe upon human rights embodied in universal 
human rights instruments’.65  In this regard the Bosnian Genocide Case may prove to 
be instructive in that while the SC is obligated not to infringe human rights as a matter 
of treaty law for example,66 it may also be obligated to prevent human rights violations 
such as genocide and ethnic cleansing.  
 
This formulation of the relationship between right authority and just cause demands a 
role for international law in SC decision-making, specifically international human 
rights law and international humanitarian law especially as criterion for recourse to 
enforcement action.  Injecting the rule of law into SC decision-making in respect of the 
responsibility to react serves to guard against abuse with international human rights law 
and international humanitarian law separating ‘the few sheep of legitimate 
humanitarianism from the herds of goats’.67  Moreover, these perspectives on the close 
                                                 
62 Alexander Orakhelashvili, ‘The Impact of Peremptory Norms on the Interpretation and the 
Application of United Nations Security Council Resolutions’ (2005) 16 EJl 59 
63 The ICJ stated: ‘The political character of an organ cannot release it from the observance of the 
treaty provisions established by the Charter when they constitute limitations on its powers or criteria 
for its judgment’.  Conditions of Admissions of a State to Membership of the United Nations (Article 4 
of the Charter) [1947-8] ICJ Rep 57, 64.   
64 Cf. Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Yugoslavia) [1996] ICJ Rep 595.  The European Court of 
Justice recently declared that it can indirectly check ‘the lawfulness of the resolutions of the Security 
Council in question with regard to jus cogens, understood as a body of higher rules of public 
international law binding on all subjects of international law, including the bodies of the United 
Nations, and from which no derogation is possible’ Ahmed Ali Yusuf and Al Barakaat International 
Foundation v Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities (Case T-
306/01) (Court of First Instance of the European Communities, 21 September 2005) available at 
http://curia.int, para 277. 
65 Orakhelashvili (n 62) 
66 Orakhelashvili (n 62) 
67 Thomas M. Franck and Nigel S. Rodley, ‘After Bangladesh: The Law of Humanitarian Intervention 
by Military Force’ (1973) 67 AJIL 275, 284. 
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connection between right authority and just cause can be amalgamated in that the 
common values that the SC acts to uphold are jus cogens norms.  Drawing a connection 
between right authority and just cause in this way, maintains SC discretion when 
making Article 39 determinations as to whether a threat to the peace exists triggering 
enforcement measures while guarding against abuse in the exercise of those powers.  
For, in the last analysis, these criteria for military intervention for human protection 
purposes galvanise the SC to act in the face of humanitarian crises such as large-scale 
killing and large-scale ethnic cleansing as a matter of legal obligation rather than 
political will which is heavily reliant on public opinion.68   
C. Right Intention 
Michael Walzer observes that: 
[c]lear examples of what is called ‘humanitarian intervention’ are very rare.  
Indeed, I have not found any, but only mixed cases where the humanitarian 
motive is one among several.  States’ don’t send their soldiers into other states, 
it seems, only in order to save lives.69 
 
This observation underscores the imperative of the criterion of right intention in the just 
war tradition and speaks to the Trojan Horse arguments made by developing states at 
the World Summit in respect of the guidelines for military intervention for human 
protection purposes.  However, as Bellamy emphasises, the just war tradition draws a 
distinction between motive and intention requiring ‘that those embarking on 
humanitarian intervention have a primarily humanitarian intent’70 which is echoed by 
the HLP.71  Thus the SC when authorising Chapter VII enforcement measures does so 
to maintain international peace and security, but it may do so with different intentions 
as exemplified by the diverse range of situations that fall to be considered threats to the 
peace under Article 39.   
                                                 
68 In this respect Alex J. Bellamy observed ‘that there is little evidence to suggest that states intervene 
in foreign emergencies because they are in some sense morally shamed into doing so by either 
domestic or global public opinion’.  Bellamy ‘Whither’ (n 11) 150-1. 
69 Walzer (n 49) 101.   
70 Bellamy, Just Wars (n 21) 211 (italics in original). 
71 HLP (n 1) para. 207 (b). 
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III. UN PEACE OPERATIONS AND ‘HUMAN PROTECTION 
OPERATIONS’ 
The criteria of last resort, proportional means and reasonable prospects speak directly 
to the capacity of UN peace operations to discharge the responsibility to react.  As such 
this Part draws on the just war tradition to explore the role for UN peace operations 
envisioned by the ICISS and the HLP under the responsibility to react by way of 
reference to last resort, proportional means and reasonable prospects, with UNAMID, 
the hybrid UN/African Union (AU) mission for Darfur, as a reference point.  Moreover, 
as UNAMID has a Chapter VII mandate to use force to protect the civilian population, 
the Part also draws upon the aspects of jus in bello (conduct in war) that are found in 
international law, specifically international humanitarian law.  
A. Last Resort 
As the crisis situation in Darfur worsened in the months following the outbreak of 
violence in February 2003, the AU deployed the African Union Mission in the Sudan 
(AMIS), while, as noted above, the SC imposed sanctions in July 2004.72  The following 
year the SC established the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS),73 and referred 
the situation in Darfur to the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court.74  It was 
this plethora of responses to the crisis that, in part, prompted the International Crisis 
Group (ICG) to assert that ‘[m]uch more still can and should be done by the 
international community’ and ultimately to conclude that the last resort criterion for 
military intervention for human protection purposes in Darfur had not been fulfilled.75  
Yet, during this time Human Rights Watch continued to record mass human rights 
violations along with increases in the numbers seeking refuge in neighbouring Chad 
and those internally displaced,76 while AMIS was plagued by criticisms of being under-
resourced and under-mandated.  This disjuncture between the response to and the reality 
of the crisis in Darfur underscores the observation by Nicholas Wheeler that ‘during 
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the time that policy-makers are trying to achieve a halt to the abuses through non-
violent means, massacres and expulsions might be continuing on the ground’.77  In 
providing guidance as to the content of the last resort criterion the just war tradition 
illuminates a potential role for international law in bridging the dissonance between the 
response to and the reality of a humanitarian crisis, such as genocide or ethnic 
cleansing.  
 
In the just war tradition the requirement of last resort is often linked to the principle of 
necessity as it involves a calculation that military force is ‘the only feasible strategy’.78  
As Bellamy observes such a calculation does not ‘require the exhaustion of every means 
short of force’79 but rather, as the ICISS recognised, ‘there must be reasonable grounds 
for believing that, in all the circumstances, if the measure [short of force] had been 
attempted it would not have succeeded’.80  This understanding of last resort echoes the 
principle of necessity found in the international law governing the use of force in self-
defence.  In international law, the necessity to use force in self-defence must be ‘instant, 
overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation’ and, as 
the force is justified by necessity, it ‘must be limited by that necessity and kept clearly 
within it’.81  This classic statement of the principle of necessity in the international law 
of self-defence is relatively uncontroversial.82  For instance it is generally accepted that 
the purpose of the use of force in self-defence is to repel an armed attack and must cease 
once the attack has been repelled.  Thus the ICJ in Nicaragua found that as the armed 
opposition against El Salvador had been completely repulsed before the US had begun 
to take action, there was no necessity of self-defence.83  It is this connection between 
the necessity of self-defence and an armed attack that is instructive in determining 
whether the last resort criterion has been fulfilled.  When considering whether it was 
necessary for the US to use force in self-defence, the ICJ in Nicaragua set out a scale 
and effects test, i.e. looked at the nature of the attacks concerned84 and did not focus on 
the ‘likelihood that peaceful means may be effective to restore peace and remove the 
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attackers’.85  In short, in deciding whether military force for human protection purposes 
is the ‘last resort’ account must be had of the nature of the situation.  This approach has 
the benefit of re-focusing our attention on the why of the international responsibility to 
react, namely to protect populations from ‘genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing or 
crimes against humanity’86 and lends greater determinacy to SC decision-making in 
authorising the use of military force for human protection purposes. 
B. Reasonable Prospects 
With the continuing violence highlighting the deficiencies in the responses by the UN 
and the AU to the crisis in Darfur, the UN and AU concentrated efforts on creating a 
robust UN peace operation to replace the ‘beleaguered African troops’.87  Despite the 
obfuscation of Russia and China, these efforts crystallised in SC Resolution 1706 
(2006) which provided for 17,300 military personnel88 with a Chapter VII mandate to 
use force to, amongst others, protect the civilian population.89  However the Sudanese 
government refused to consent to the deployment of the proposed peace operation 
calling the mission ‘a ‘colonialist’ attempt to subjugate the country’.90  A period of 
intense negotiation followed between the UN, the AU and the Sudanese government 
with SC Resolution 1769 finally passed in July 2007, with Russia and China abstaining, 
establishing UNAMID a hybrid UN/AU peace operation with a Chapter VII civilian 
protection mandate and 20,600 personnel, including 19,555 troops.91  The abstention of 
Russia and China, along with the reliance on the consent of Sudan, underscores the 
pivotal role of reasonable prospects in the guidelines for military intervention.  For 
instance, the P-5 are automatically disqualified from military intervention for human 
protection proposes under the requirement of reasonable prospects.  Moreover, Sudan 
continued to delay troop deployment with 15, 179 uniformed personnel, including 12, 
359 troops deployed to the region as of 31 January 2009.92   
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In addition to delayed troop deployment, UNAMID also faces challenges such as 
financing and equipment concerns, notwithstanding the Chapter VII civilian protection 
mandate.93  These operational and logistical challenges serve to undermine the 
reasonable prospects of success for UNAMID as a ‘human protection operation’.  
Indeed James Sloan counts inadequate resources as a reason for the failure of peace 
operations with a Chapter VII civilian protection mandate and advocates returning to 
traditional peacekeeping doctrine of the use of force only in self-defence.94   
C. Proportional Means 
Proportionality infuses the just war tradition, firstly as a requirement governing the 
resort to war (jus ad bellum) and secondly, as a requirement governing conduct in war 
(jus in bello).  The rationale underpinning proportionality in the just war tradition, 
particularly jus ad bellum, is to ensure that ‘the overall harm likely to be caused by the 
war is less than that caused by the wrong that is being righted’.95  The HLP framed this 
requirement as ‘are the scale, duration and intensity of the proposed military action the 
minimum necessary to meet the threat in question?’96 which was answered in the 
affirmative by the ICG when considering whether the responsibility to react should be 
exercised in respect of the crisis in Darfur, as ‘[a]ny military intervention would be 
narrowly concentrated on protecting civilians and halting lawlessness and impunity in 
Darfur’.97  In this respect it is noteworthy that SC Resolution 1769 authorises UNAMID 
under Chapter VII of the Charter to ‘take the necessary action’ to, amongst others, 
protect civilians.98  Thus this section assesses the role of proportionality in ‘calibrating 
means and ends’ in respect of the Chapter VII civilian protection mandate of UNAMID. 
 
The insistence that ‘[t]he means have to be commensurate with the ends’99 in the 
guidelines for military intervention for human protection purposes accentuates the 
‘fundamental question as to whether violent means can ever serve humanitarian 
purposes’.100  The requirement that military intervention does ‘more good than harm’ 
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entails assessing the adverse humanitarian impact of military intervention against the 
humanitarian objective of the intervention, such as the protection of the civilian 
population from genocide and ethnic cleansing.  Nigel S. Rodley succinctly explained 
this balance as: ‘the gravity and extent of the violations [must] be on a level 
commensurate with the reasonably calculable loss of life, destruction of property [and] 
expenditure of resources’.101  Yet, the UN and AU when formulating the mandate for 
UNAMID did not undertake an in-depth field assessment of the situation in Darfur.102  
This failure, in addition leaving UNAMID bereft of a concept for operations as regards 
its role in civilian protection,103 casts doubt on the proportionality of the military 
intervention in Darfur and arguably undermines the credibility of UNAMID.   
 
Moreover the discernible trend in UN practice since the 1990’s to ‘bestow forceful 
mandates on peacekeeping operations’104 is controversial not in the least because such 
a peace operation ‘virtually always produces destructive and counterproductive 
results’.105  This brings proportionality in the conduct of war – jus in bello - into sharp 
relief.  As noted above jus in bello requires a proportionality assessment whereby 
‘military targets may only be attacked when their military value outweighs the 
foreseeable destruction that will result’,106 along with the principle of discrimination or 
non-combatant immunity and the non-use of prohibited weapons.  These jus in bello 
requirements are embodied in international humanitarian law which, for example, 
speaks of non-combatant immunity in addition to protecting civilians from the 
consequences of war and ensuring the provision of or access to essentials for survival, 
while there is an impressive body of international treaties dedicated to prohibiting the 
use of specific weapons.  In this respect it is noteworthy that it is widely accepted that 
international humanitarian law applies to peace operations.107  In this sense 
international humanitarian law, with its emphasis on proportionality, discrimination 
and prohibited weapons, operates to minimise the adverse humanitarian impact of the 
use of force.   
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However, the principle of military necessity in conjunction with the doctrine of double-
effect in the just war tradition permits the killing of non-combatants as ‘unintended but 
foreseeable deaths’.108  In this connection Walzer argues that ‘[c]ivilians have a right 
to something more. And if saving civilian lives means risking soldier’s lives, the risk 
must be accepted’, concluding that ‘[w]e can only ask soldiers to minimise the dangers 
they impose’109.  In this respect it is pertinent to note the two additional criteria to 
complement jus in bello in military interventions for human protection purposes 
identified by Bellamy, the first of which is due care in the selection of targets and 
weapons while the second concerns the selection of a military strategy that will ‘achieve 
the best humanitarian outcome in the shortest amount of time and with the least danger 
to non-combatants’.110  It is in regards to the selection of military strategy, targets and 
weapons that a role may be accorded to international human rights law in providing a 
further layer of prudence in the use of force to protect civilians.111  For instance, the 
right to life, the prohibition on torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment 
and the right to an adequate standard of living, including food, clothing, housing and 
medical care are especially relevant when selecting targets and weapons.   
 
However, while it is generally accepted that international human rights law applies 
regardless of whether an armed conflict exists or not,112 the extent of that application is 
hotly contested in part due to the contested contours of the relationship with 
international humanitarian law.  The dominant perspective to the relationship between 
international human rights and international humanitarian law is to consider 
international humanitarian law as lex specialis in circumstances of armed conflict.113  
However, the ICJ recently acknowledged that there are three ways to conceive of the 
relationship between international human rights law and international humanitarian law 
namely, ‘some rights may be exclusively matters of international humanitarian law; 
others may be exclusively matters of human rights law; yet others may be matters of 
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both these branches of international law’.114  Nehal Bhuta calls this latter approach 
‘interpretative complementarity’115 which is characterised by the use of international 
human rights law ‘to inform and ‘humanise’ international humanitarian law while 
international humanitarian law is ‘used to give content to [international human rights 
law] in certain exceptional states’.116  Kenneth Watkins, when discussing the control of 
the use of deadly force, adopts this understanding of the relationship between 
international human rights law and international humanitarian law as ‘the issue should 
not be the exclusive application of either framework but, rather, that appropriate 
principles should be applied to ensure that there are no gaps in humanitarian 
protection’.117 
 
Viewing the relationship between international humanitarian law and international 
human rights law in this way offers a departure point from which to clarify the limits 
on the use of force to protect civilian populations.  Such clarification is urgently 
required if human protection operations are to be successful in doing ‘more good than 
harm’.  Moreover, such current ambiguities are compounded by the practical reality 
that peace operations with a Chapter VII civilian protection mandate have been largely 
unsuccessful.118  In this regard it pertinent to note the words of caution issued in the 
Brahimi Report namely, ‘[i]f an operation is given a mandate to protect civilians, 
therefore, it also must be given the specific resources needed to carry out that 
mandate’.119 
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The just war tradition as Bellamy observes ‘is a two-thousand-year conversation about 
the legitimacy of war’.120  This article drew upon this long-standing and rich convention 
to assess and develop the guidelines for military intervention for human protection 
purposes and which provided a fruitful frame to analyse the roles of the SC and UN 
peace operations under the responsibility to react.  For instance the just war tradition 
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re-frames the issue of legitimacy and authority plaguing the SC and offers an avenue 
by which to clarify the legal framework for UN peace operations.  In doing so, the 
perspective brought to bear by the just war tradition illuminated a role for international 
law in guiding SC decision-making in respect of humanitarian crises especially when 
jus cogens norms are at issue, along with a role for international humanitarian law and 
international human rights law in regulating the use of force in Chapter VII civilian 
protection mandates.  In addition, the guidelines for military intervention are 
strengthened by the role for international law illuminated by the just war tradition.  For 
instance, as alluded to above, the reliance on public opinion to galvanise the SC to act 
is tempered by the role accorded to international law in SC decision-making which 
similarly counters the charge of indeterminacy levelled at the just cause threshold.  In 
this way, the just war tradition breathes ‘doctrinal, policy and institutional life’121 into 
this facet of the responsibility to protect.   
 
Moreover, the just war tradition addressed the arguments as to SC discretion and abuse 
that prompted the removal of the guidelines for military intervention from the Outcome 
Document and thus underscores Alex de Waal’s observation that the responsibility to 
protect, as presently articulated by the UN, is inadequately conceptualised.122 
Moreover, the removal of the guidelines undermines the capacity of the UN to respond 
to ‘genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity’123 as too 
readily evidenced by the response to the crisis in Darfur discussed above.  In the last 
analysis, to paraphrase the HLP, the UN having given birth to the responsibility to 
protect, has proven poorly equipped to implement it.124  
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